The purpose of this paper is to estimate wage effects of occupational pensions, exploiting the introduction of mandatory occupational pensions in Norway as a source of exogenous variation in pension coverage. Various difference-in-differences models are estimated on a large sample of Norwegian private sector firms. The results indicate that on average, less than half the costs of a minimum requirement occupational pension was shifted from firms to workers in terms of lower wages, and that there are important heterogeneities with respect to the influence of local unions and central negotiations on the wage setting in different industries.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effect of occupational pensions (OPs) on wages for a large sample of Norwegian private sector firms. Knowledge about the offset between pensions and wages is becoming increasingly important, as OPs are expected to play a more prominent role in retirement provision in many countries where governments seek to reduce their pension commitments.
In Norway, mandatory OPs were introduced in 2006 as part of an ongoing reform of the public pension system. One of the arguments behind this new mandate was based on a concern that workers not covered by an OP would be left with insufficient pension benefits under a new and less generous public pension regime. Mandatory OPs along with cuts in public pensions may be a politically attractive alternative to higher taxes and less drastic cuts in public pensions, and an assessment of the extent to which the costs of such mandated benefits are shared between firms and workers is crucial if one wants to know who bears the costs of pension reforms.
Occupational pensions are part of compensation packages offered by firms to workers, and identification of the offset between pensions and wages is complicated by the joint determination of pensions, wages and other forms of compensation. The positive coefficient on pensions which is typically found in cross section wage regressions (see e.g. Hernaes et al. (2010) ) is thus likely to be corrupted by simultaneity bias and the imperfect observability of productivity. In this paper, a difference-in-differences strategy is used to exploit the introduction of mandatory OPs in Norway as a source of exogenous variation in pension coverage. Provided that the counter-factual trends in firm level wages are independent of pre-reform OP status, conditional on observed covariates, this approach gives unbiased and consistent estimates of the offset factor between pensions and wages.
As only half the workers in the Norwegian private sector were covered by an occupational pension prior to the reform, a natural question to ask is the following: What motivates some firms to offer an OP while others choose not to? Gustman et al. (1994) point to several possible reasons, one being that firms offer OPs simply because they are demanded by workers. Such a demand from workers may be motivated by the fact that both contributions and benefits tend to be tax-favoured, so that the after-tax return to savings in OP schemes may exceed the return earned in other savings vehicles. This feature makes OPs more attractive to high-wage workers than to workers with lower wages, given that taxes on wage income are progressive. There may also exist economies of scale, making group-saving more cost effective than individual saving, which may help explain the stylized fact that OPs have been a large firm phenomenon.
A third reason why workers may desire OPs is that they often provide insurance of a type that is hard to obtain otherwise than through OP schemes, such as for instance disability insurance.
Occupational pensions may also be used by firms as a means of minimizing labour costs and increasing productivity. In a setting with lifetime contracts, Lazear (1981) argued that deferred compensation could be used to minimize the cost of inducing optimal effort in firms where monitoring effort is difficult or costly. In the absence of lifetime contracts, firms faced with substantial hiring and training costs could use OPs to discourage turnover and/or as a means of attracting stayers rather than movers. Defined benefit (DB) pensions are particularly well suited for this purpose, as they are designed to give a certain proportion of the final wage as yearly pension benefits, and as DB pension covered workers typically face capital losses if they leave the firm prior to retirement (see Hernaes et al. (2011) ). Finally, OPs may be used to induce retirement for workers whose productivity falls by age, by making retirement more economically attractive. Hernaes et al. (2010) provide evidence that supports several of the hypotheses above: Occupational pensions are typically found in large firms (economies of scale), in firms where tax gains to the employees are high, and in firms where long periods of training are required. They also find that the occurrence of an OP increases tenure substantially, and that firms with the most to gain in terms of higher expected tenure were those who actually chose to have an OP. The data used for the analyses in this paper does not contain direct information on all the above-mentioned aspects, but the available set of covariates should nevertheless be sufficient to account for the main differences between firms with and without OPs prior to the reform.
As for the economic incidence of mandatory OPs, the question asked in this paper is whether or not it falls on workers in terms of reduced wages. Employers are obliged by law to cover the direct costs, consisting of contributions, waiver of contribution (to cover continued contributions in the event of disability) and administrative costs, but they may well have been able to shift parts of these costs onto employees. If the full costs are borne by the affected workers one would expect to see no effects on employment, and one would not need to be concerned about redistributive effects of the mandate. Given that the estimated average treatment effects in this paper indicate that only half the costs of a minimum requirement OP is passed on to workers in terms of lower wages, one could ask whether there have been adjustments in non-wage amenities other than pensions. We note that crude measures of the prevalence of non-wage amenities provided by Statistics Norway (http://www.ssb.no/english/) show that the fraction of workers receiving such types of compensation has gone up rather than down over the relevant period, and leave non-wage amenities aside.
Firms that are unable to shift the full costs onto workers by adjusting compensation could either adjust employment, or try to pass it on to consumers in terms of price adjustments or to firm owners through reduced profits. In each of these cases, the mandate may have redistributive effects. One might see redistribution from less productive to more productive workers, if low productivity workers are forced to reduce their hours of work, or from consumers or firm owners to previously uncovered workers. This paper, however, is devoted exclusively to an investigation of the wage effects of the mandate.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews some related theoretical and empirical literature, before Section 3 gives a brief history of occupational pensions in Norway, including a description of the process that materialised into mandatory OPs. This background information is essential to the interpretation of the empirical results of this analysis. Section 4 describes the three sources of data that are used to create a sample consisting of 10,392 Norwegian private sector firms, and gives some descriptive statistics. Firms with no OP in place prior to the reform constitute 40% of the firms in the sample, and these differ from the OP-firms in a number of ways: They are smaller, pay lower wages and employ younger and less educated workers.
The empirical specifications are spelled out in Section 5. The main focus from there on is on various difference-in-differences models, with the support of the corresponding versions with firm level fixed effects. Estimation results given in Section 6 indicate that there has been some cost sharing between firms and workers, but the costs of occupational pensions are not fully shifted onto workers. The fixed effects estimates are reduced by about 60% when a small number of firms with very high or very low estimated propensities to have an OP prior to the reform are removed from the sample. I argue that this difference is mostly due to very high wage growth among the firms with the highest estimated propensities, and base the further investigations described in Section 7 on a reduced sample consisting of more comparable firms. Results from a specification that allows for both pre-and post-reform effects indicate that firms were holding back on wages several years before the reform was formally implemented, but the closest we get to a full shift is about 50% of costs shifted onto workers (in 2009). The final specification takes into account these dynamic adjustments at the same time as it allows the treatment effects to vary with measures of the share of unionised workers and the influence of central negotiations on wages in different activities. More appears to be shifted onto workers in activities where wages are influenced by central, but not local negotiations, and in activities with low shares of unionised workers.
Section 8 concludes and gives some prospects for further work.
Related literature
Assuming first that the mandated benefit is perceived as a regular tax both by workers and by firms, that is, that workers assign no value to the future pension benefits, we know from the textbook example of tax incidence in competitive markets that the "least elastic" side of the market ends up paying most of the tax. Also, if the labour supply curve for some exogenous reason becomes steeper ("less elastic"), the model predicts that a bigger proportion of the tax burden will be shifted onto workers through lower wages, and effects on employment will be lower. Summers (1989) pointed out that if workers assign some value to OPs, one may expect a positive shift in labour supply when the mandate is implemented. Again, more of the costs would be shifted onto workers and effects on employment would be lower, along with a reduced dead weight loss. Summers et al. (1993) argued that unions are more likely than individuals to recognise the link between contributions paid and benefits received, implying that a shift in labour supply is more likely to occur in labour markets in which unions play a central role, as they do in countries like Norway. In the limiting case where workers' (or unions') valuation of the mandated benefit is the same as its cost to firms, the entire cost will be shifted onto workers, there will be no effects on employment and thus no dead weight loss associated with the mandate. Mandating OPs would then be a more efficient way of securing sufficient pensions for otherwise non-covered workers than publicly provided pensions financed through taxes. Another part of this story is that if the costs of OPs are not fully shifted onto workers, it must be either because OPs are not sufficiently valued by workers/unions, or because there are impediments to the adjustment of relative wages to reflect workers' valuation. Alesina and Perotti (1997) present a theoretical model that predicts a humpshaped relationship between the degree of centralisation, defined as the inverse of the number of unions in the economy, and the degree of shifting of labour taxation. The intuition behind this relationship is that larger parts of the labour tax burden is borne by employees in competitive labour markets, with inelastic individual labour supply, and in centralised economies, where a small number of unions internalise macroeconomic constraints and effects of wage increases on labour costs and employment, than in economies with intermediate levels of centralisation, where unions are large enough to have significant impacts on wages but too small or too numerous to properly internalise the adverse effects of bargaining outcomes. The theoretical predictions are supported by empirical evidence from data on the manufacturing sector in 14 OECD countries.
Turning to the empirical literature on the incidence of mandated benefits, a notable example is Gruber (1994) , who studied the economic incidence of mandated maternity benefits in the US. His findings consistently suggest full shifting of the costs of the mandates and he found little effect on total labour input for the groups of workers affected by the mandates. A more recent contribution is a study of the incidence of social security contributions by Ooghe et al. (2003) , based on sectoral panel data covering six different European countries. Testing the predictions of an efficient bargaining model they find that at least 50% of both legal and customary contributions are shifted onto workers, and suggest that these results are due to trade unions recognizing the link between contributions and benefits during wage negotiations. Finally, a study of the incidence of non-wage labour costs in OECD countries by Azémar and Desbordes (2010) establishes that in countries with highly coordinated bargaining, the entire tax burden appears to be shifted immediately onto workers.
We will return to the impacts of centralised negotiations and local labour unions in Section 7, and see results that are well in line with the above referenced literature on the topic.
Institutional background
The Norwegian pension system may be seen as one consisting of three different layers, of which the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) constitutes the first. The NIS provides universal coverage, meaning that all citizens above the age of 67 are guaranteed a minimum pension. On top of this comes an earnings related pension for those who have had sufficient earnings throughout their career. The second and third layers are occupational pension schemes and voluntary individual savings.
As for the occupational pensions there are separate systems for the public and the private sectors. The public sector scheme is of the defined benefit 1 type, and guarantees yearly pension payments corresponding to 66% of the final yearly wage income after 30 years of service. The market for OPs in the private sector used to be strongly dominated by DB pensions, as contributions qualified as a tax deductible cost only for pension plans of this type until 2001, when there was a change in legislation. Since then, firms' contributions to both defined benefit and defined contribution plans are treated like wages for tax purposes, provided the plan meets a set of requirements imposed by the government.
For employees, both contributions and accumulations are tax exempted, while benefits are taxed under the income tax, but at a lower rate than wage income.
The new legislation appears to have led to a marked increase in the number of firms operating a DC plan, but the majority of firms establishing DC plans were already operating a DB plan, which would typically be closed for new entrants as soon as the new DC plan was in place. The increase in individual OP coverage and in the number of firms operating OPs followed by the new legislation was thus fairly moderate (see e.g. Midtsundstad and Hippe (2005) and Veland (2008) ). Motivated by a concern for non-covered workers, the labour unions made a first proper attempt to establish a collective OP scheme for the private sector during the central negotiations in 2002. This did not succeed, but a settlement on mandatory OPs was part of the outcome of the central negotiations two years later, in 2004. The final result of this settlement was the Act relating to mandatory occupational pensions, which entered into force on 1 DB pensions schemes are designed such that they guarantee or target a certain level of pension benefits, defined as a proportion of final yearly wage income. In Defined Contribution (DC) pension schemes there is no such guarantee or target -they specify the annual contributions in stead (as a proportion of wages). 2 . It appears that most of the firms that were forced by the Act to introduce an OP chose the minimum level of generousity (see Veland (2008) ).
Another central element of the Act is that employers are obliged to cover the direct costs related to the OP, including contributions, waiver of contribution (to cover continued contributions in the event of disability) and administrative costs. For a minimum requirement OP these costs amount to about 2.6% of earnings.
4 Data, sample and descriptive statistics
The data
The empirical analysis is based upon three sources of data; the Register of Employers and Employees (REE), and pension liabilities and costs, respectively, from a set of balance sheet data and a set of accounting data. The REE is a linked employer-employee data set based on administrative registers, and covers the entire Norwegian working-age population over the period 1992-2009. For each pair (employer, employee), the REE contains a wide range of both individual and firm specific information, such as age, hours worked, earned income, opening and closing dates for the employment record, industry code, geographical location and organizational structure.
2 The Basic amount is frequently referred to as G, and is a central feature of the public pension system in Norway. G is adjusted every year, with a nominal rate of growth varying between 2 and 14% since its introduction in 1967. The average G for 2010 was 74721 NOK, which corresponds to about 9300 EUR or 8000 GBP. For further details on G and on the public pension system in general, see e.g. Iskhakov (2008) . 
The sample
Based upon the union of the three data sources described above I define a panel firms, and among these were 40 percent without an OP prior to the Act, while 27 percent had a DC plan and about 32 percent of the firms had a private sector DB pension plan (Table 1) . 62 percent of the employees associated with these firms were covered by a private sector DB pension, which confirms the stylized fact that occupational pensions of the DB type is a large firm phenomenon. The fractions of firms and employees in the four sectors remained fairly stable across the observation period. More detailed descriptive statistics are given in Table 2 . and for each of the eight years. Group level averages of log-wages are plotted in Figure 2 . The two figures show that there has been some growth in real wages in all three groups over the period of observation. Also, the spread of real wages appear to have increased, and the observed (unadjusted) trends in log-wages do not seem to be too different across OP and No OP firms.
Empirical specification and identification
The identification strategy is built upon the idea of exploiting the introduction of mandatory occupational pensions as a source of exogenous variation in pension coverage. A difference-in-differences way of thinking seems promising in this setting. Letw jst denote the outcome of interest, specified as the natural log of the average wage among full-time, full-year employees in firm j in group s at time t. 6 The observed wage isw 0 jst for the non-treated andw 1 jst for the treated, and only one of these is observed for each firm. The key identifying assumption is that the counter factual trend behavior of log-wages is the same for 6 Both the notation and the framing of the estimation strategy in this section is borrowed from Angrist and Pischke (2009) . the treatment and control groups, conditional on observed covariates. 7 In other words, we assume that the growth rate in log-wages before and after the reform would have been the same for No OP-firms as for OP-firms, in the absence of reform. Now, as treatment status varies only at the group level in this particular case, one may argue that the source of omitted variable bias is most likely to be unobserved variables at the OP-group and year level. The idea behind the difference-in-differences identification strategy is that these group-level omitted variables can be captured by group-level fixed effects.
Assume that in the absence of reform, the outcome variable is determined by a time-invariant group or OP-status effect (γ s ), a common year effect (λ t ) and observed firm-specific covariates (X jt ), that is,
As a first approach, we assume that the effect of treatment is additive and constant, denoted by δ, so that
Together these assumptions imply that the observed outcome may be written
where E [ε jst |s, t, X jt ] = 0 and D st is an indicator for treatment status, the 7 We also need two other assumptions to be satisfied: First, the reform must be exogenous in the sense that it did not just institutionalise a pre-existing trend towards broader OPcoverage. This assumption is likely to hold true, cf. the discussion in Section 3. Second, there can be no spill-over or general equilibrium effects of the reform. This assumption would be questionable if for instance the reform led many firms to close down, which in turn would lead to increased supply of certain groups of workers and therefore to lower wages for the same groups of workers and their substitutes.
regressor of interest. The population difference-in-differences is
where t and t denote before-and after-reform observations. δ thus gives us the difference in log-wages before and after the reform for those directly affected by the reform (the treatment group) relatively to those who were not affected by the reform (the control groups), taking account for observed firm-specific characteristics, unobserved group fixed effects and economy-wide factors potentially affecting the various groups over time.
It may well be that the 'group level fixed effects' way of thinking is too "rough", i.e. that unobserved factors at the firm level are of great importance for the wage levels. Assuming that these factors are constant over time, and retaining the assumptions of equal counterfactual trend behavior in the treatment and control groups and of constant and additive treatment effect, we specify a modified version of (1) as follows:
F j are the unobserved firm fixed effects, and X jt are observed time varying covariates.
Estimation
In this section I use linear regression to estimate different versions of equation (1) 
where Turning to the firm level fixed effects specification, the equation to be estimated is equation (2), with I j · d t = D jt and with industry specific year effects:
where the dummies for geographical location are left out due to lack of variation across time periods. The weighting strategy described above will also be applied to equation (4).
Initial results
We start by estimating (3) and (4) Strictly negative treatment effects would thus indicate that there has been some degree of cost sharing between firms and employees, and to conclude that the complete costs are shifted onto employees we would requireδ < −0.026, as the costs of a minimum requirement OP is approximately 2.6 per cent of wages. Table 3 show results from OLS and WLS on (3) and WLS on (4), hereafter referred to as FE. The unweighted OP-group level fixed effects estimate of δ (column 1) is a non-significant -0.3 per cent, the WLS estimate is -0.5 per cent, whereas the firm level fixed effects estimate is precisely estimated at -1.3 per cent. This would indicate that firms were only able to shift about half (-1.3/-2.6) the costs onto their employees.
The difference between the OLS treatment effect and the two weighted estimates may be interpreted in at least two ways. First, they may indicate heterogeneities across firms of different sizes. OLS treatment effects being "less negative" than WLS treatment effects could in this case reflect that costs are more easily shifted onto employees in larger firms than in smaller firms, possibly due to different wage setting mechanisms. The difference could also be caused by more generous OP schemes being chosen in larger treatment group firms. We do not observe the level of generosity in our data, but results from a survey conducted in 2007 indicate that the vast majority of firms induced by the reform to introduce an OP chose the minimum level of generosity, i.e. contributions corresponding to two per cent of wages (see Veland (2008) ). Different levels of generosity are thus not likely to drive the results. Second, it could be that wages have grown faster in some of the bigger comparison group firms than in the other firms in the sample. The fact that the OP-group fixed effect for DC-firms switches from negative to positive when weights are added would support this hypothesis, as such a switch is indicative of very high wages among a relatively small number of large DC-firms. This is further explored in the following section.
Estimation results for (3) when the covariates in X jst are included in a stepwise manner are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. The OLS estimate of the treatment effect is fairly stable across specifications, but never significantly different from zero.
Robustness
The descriptive statistics in Section 4.2 showed how the NoOP-firms differ from the two other groups of firms with respect to size, average wages, industries and several characteristics of their employees. In the preceding section we saw how the estimated treatment effect increased in absolute value and how the OP- group fixed effect for DC-firms changed sign when weights reflecting firm size were applied. To follow up on this issue I have estimated versions of (3) and (4) with four firm size specific treatment effects. Estimation results for these specifications gave no clear indications of heterogeneities with respect to firm size, and are thus not reported. Also unreported are results from specifications in which interactions with the treatment indicator and the right hand side variables were included, as these revealed no clear patterns, but rather underlined the discrepancies across specifications.
A more fundamental issue is that the assumption of common counter-factual trends for treatment and control group firms may be questionable when firms are very different in terms of observables, so that there is a potential for selection bias even when these observed covariates are included as controls in the regressions. To cope with such a lack of overlap in the covariate distribution between treatment groups, we will follow Crump et al. (2009) Table A2 in the Appendix. The shape of the densities in Figure 3 suggest that there are characteristics with a very strong and positive relation with the propensity to have an OP, whereas there are no characteristics with predictive power of the same magnitude for the probability of not having an OP. This is confirmed by the estimates in Table A2 , with firm size being the single most important predictor of having an OP. Table 4 shows estimated treatment effects from (3) and (4) for the full sample (Columns 1-3), for a sample of firms with estimated propensity scores below 0.9
(Columns 4-6), and for one consisting of firms with propensity scores within Table 5 . Prob-lems related to a lack of overlap in the covariate distribution should be less likely for this sample than for the full sample, but might still be a concern. Hence I have reported the normalised difference for each of the covariates, defined as the difference in averages by treatment status, divided by the square root of the sum of the variances (Column 5 and 6). Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest as a rule of thumb that linear regression methods might be sensitive to the functional form assumption if the normalised difference exceeds one quarter. This is the case for two of the variables: the number of employees and the mean age of the employees. The former enters only as weights (2005 values) in the regressions, and we saw in Table 4 how the inclusion of these weights has minor impacts on the estimated coefficients when regressions are run on the restricted sample. Mean age is included as a cubic polynomial in the regressions.
Although there are still differences in observed covariates between NoOP and OP firms, these do not appear to have changed dramatically over the observation period. Had there been substantial changes in the differences in the observable characteristics of treatment and comparison group firms over time, one might as well have been concerned about unobserved compositional changes. Such a concern would have called the difference-in-differences strategy into question. (3) and (4) 
and the nine difference-in-differences estimators are defined as 2001, 2002, . . ., 2009 . The fixed effects specification is modified accordingly.
Estimation results for (5) are given in Table 6 . First, we note that the estimated treatment effects for the first three years are close to zero for all three specifications, meaning that the differences in wage levels between treatment and control group firms are now well accounted for by the covariates in X.
Judging from the estimated treatment effects for 2004 and onwards it appears that the reform did affect wages prior to its formal implementation, although the effects were rather moderate, ranging from about -0.7 to about -1.2 per cent (FE). Based on these observations it appears that firms were holding back on wages already from the year in which a settlement was reached on mandatory occupational pensions (2004) , and that the cost sharing peaked at nearly 50% (-1.2/-2.6) of the costs of a minimum requirement pension shifted onto workers in 2009.
I have also estimated equation (5) 
The roles of labour unions and centralised negotiations
Knowing that the idea of introducing mandatory OPs in Norway was first advocated by labour unions, it seems reasonable to suspect that the degree of cost sharing may vary with the unions' influence on wages. According to Summers et al. (1993) and Ooghe et al. (2003) one should suspect to see more cost sharing in economies where the wage setting is highly centralised, if unions are more likely than individuals to recognize the link between current contributions and future benefits. This line of reasoning is also supported by Alesina and Perotti (1997) , who present a theoretical model that predicts a hump-shaped relationship between the degree of centralisation and the degree of shifting of labour taxation.
It is important to note, however, that both Summers et al. and Alesina and Perotti meant to explain cross-country differences and did not claim that the mechanisms at work within a country with a given level of centralisation are the same as those that are crucial for explaining differences between countries with different levels of centralisation. Also, it might be that the impact of unions on the economic incidence of mandated OPs, for which there is a direct link between contributions and future benefits, is very different from their impact on the incidence of mandated social security contributions (Summers et al.) Before moving on to the econometric analysis we will fix ideas by imagining an economy where both the influence of central negotiations and the bargaining power of local unions are characterised by binary variables; Central and U nionShare. By combining the two we arrive at four sub-markets with different wage setting mechanisms, as described in Table 7 To test these hypotheses we will use activity-specific union densities as a 9 Cf. Løken and Stokke (2009) for a comprehensive overview of Norwegian labour relations. in the restricted sample, whereas Central is available for 150 activities. Some descriptive statistics for each of the three groups of firms are given in Table 8 , and a scatter plot of Central against U nionShare in Figure 5 . with each of the variables U nionShare j and Central j ;
where the respective means are subtracted from U nionShare j and Central j .
Identification of the total treatment effects now relies on variation across threedigit industries within two-digit industries. This may sound a bit far-fetched, but according to Bratsberg and Raaum (2010) there is substantial variation in industrial relations and wage setting institutions across activities in the construction industry, which is the industry to which 23% of the NoOP-firms in the sample belong.
Estimation results for equation (6) estimated on the reduced sample are given in Table 9 , first with the U nionShare interactioin only (Columns 1-3), then with the Central interaction only (Columns 4-6), and finally with both interactions included (Columns 7-9), and Table 10 gives total treatment effects at different values of the two variables based on the estimates in Column 8 (WLS). We first note that more appears to be shifted onto employees in activities with low shares of unionised workers, that is, where unions are likely to have relatively low bargaining power in local negotiations. 11 It also seems to be the case that more is shifted in activities where wages being determined exclusively by the outcomes of central negotiations is more common. There are only minor changes in the estimated treatment effects when both U nionShare and Central interactions are included (Columns 7-9 compared to 1-3 and 4-6).
12
To perform an informal test of the predictions of Table 7 I have computed WLS total treatment effects at the minimum and maximum values of 11 Another possible explanation is one related to negative selection, namely that the combination of high union density and absence of OP prior to the reform is negatively related to the firm's economic condition. If wages in these firms were already close to some minimum level there would be no room for further wage reductions following the reform.
12 I have also estimated equation (6) with Mix j in place of Central j , where Mix j is the fraction of firms in each activity for which both central and local negotiations have influence on wages. This gives total treatment effects close to the main effects in Table 9 , with no significant differences across the distribution of Mix j . 
U nionShare and

Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to provide new insights about the economic The fact that labour unions at the central and local levels appear to pursue conflicting objectives for this particular matter is a finding which may deserve a more thorough analysis. Also, given that the average treatment effects suggest that a significant proportion of the costs are borne by employers, one should expect to see responses also in employment, prices or profits. A complete analysis of employment effects should take account of possible compositional changes and changes in employment levels, which would require an analytical framework different from the one applied in this paper. Sufficiently detailed data on prices and profits are not readily available, and hence an assessment of price and profit effects of the mandate must also be left for further research. 
